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The Community Case for Violence
Community work is ostensibly concerned with the wellbeing of everyday people. I  nd it
di cult to square this assumption with the conservatism of the community  eld, and it is from this
contradiction that this paper emerges. I think that the problems facing communities in the United
States are urgent, and I think that the solutions put forward by the community  eld are insu cient to
solve them. This paper outlines the contours of these beliefs. I explain the structural factors which
constrain community work, weakening community organizations and inhibiting most of them from
the use of confrontational tactics and the pursuit of radical goals. Having established the limitations of
current practices, I suggest two things: (1) that historical materialism may be a useful lens with which
to examine community problems, because it reveals broad trends and patterns, and; (2) that rioting and
looting might be considered confrontational community tactics which embody a materialist point of
view. I brie y examine the e cacy and theoretical underpinnings of this kind of action, and suggest
that these are promising tactics to support, if not perform. I end with a broad call for the community
 eld to re-examine its goals and tactics in light of the liberal capitalist context in which it is situated.
This paper argues that as long as community work cooperates with the forces imperiling people, the
 eld will be unwilling and unable to advance community health.
Methods
This paper is somewhat informal. It isn’t designed for submission to an academic journal or for
exclusively academic audiences, but with wider publication in mind—something between a piece in a
publication like The Boston Review and a social theory zine. I’ve written as clearly and directly as I can,
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only using as much academic convention as necessary to get these ideas across. My intention is to make
this paper as readable as possible, for as general of an audience as possible, because I think for
community theory to be meaningful, it should be more than accessible. It should invite people to
participate in the process of thinking about liberatory politics, which are everyone’s business.
Terms used to denote political identities and initiatives are imprecise and open to
interpretation, so a few words on this project’s taxonomy: I use the terms “abolitionist,” “liberatory,”
and “radical” interchangeably. In doing so, I mean to communicate the necessity of each word in
de ning the others (radical tactics must be abolitionist, etcetera). Radical is a term used so widely that
its meaning is diluted, and I hesitate to employ it here, but etymologically speaking it is appropriate, as
the word’s original meaning is originating in the root or ground. In this paper I refer to rooted
problems. If the problems are rooted, our strategies must be capable of grasping the roots, so radical
applies. But I am mindful of the term’s murkiness in contemporary discourse, so to be clear: I
understand radical tactics to be opposed to capitalism and liberalism and supportive of emancipatory
and abolitionist goals. I contrast radical tactics with progressive ones, which I identify as those which do
not challenge liberalism and capitalism but seek to reform them into gentler versions of themselves.
This paper is the culmination of a lot of thinking, some of which happened in academic
settings and some of which happened outside them. Some of these thoughts emerge from my lived
experience being poor and spending time working and living with other poor people. Some of them are
inspired by threads of discourse which aren’t necessarily happening in academia (or are at least
marginal within it), but occur online and in conversations between organizers and protesters, people
who participate in black bloc, online theorists, and so on. Some of them come out of conversations
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that I’ve had with my friends, who have helped me understand and interrogate many of the ideas
discussed here. I’ve cited my academic sources and I want to cite these too, because together, they have
been the core of my education on political philosophy and theory. If I have a grasp on any of these
ideas, it’s because I have discussed them, questioned them, and gradually deepened my understanding
through a collective process of dialogue and conversation.
Theory is generated from practice and community, organizing and actions, con icting and
evolving opinions and interpretations; from critical engagement with history and economy and
philosophy; from discussion; from lived experiences; and from a long line of written and oral projects.
Any theoretical work which hopes to be relevant must build on and engage with preceding and
surrounding ideas, because theory is a collaborative process of understanding things. The idea of the
individual political or philosophical thinker is ahistorical; theory is a project we are all working on
together, and it always has been. I’ve attempted to represent this process and philosophy in the formal
structure of this work.
Critiquing the community  eld
Previous criticism
This paper is a critique of the current state of community work in the United States.
“Community work” describes a variety of interrelated practices, including community development,
community organizing, and a range of other projects undertaken at the community or neighborhood
level. For the purposes of this paper, the term refers to projects, initiatives, and actions conceptualized
and executed by and for communities, with the intention of bettering things for the communities in
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question. What does “bettering” mean? Whatever the community decides it means. Community work
is about the pursuit of community goals, whatever those may be, which is a signi cant problem with
the concept. Although a group of people may be working toward a radical goal (prison abolition) or a
reactionary one (the institution of racist housing covenants), community is held to be an unquestioned
good by most practitioners and audiences (DeFilippis et al., 2010, p. 12; Sihlongonyane, 2009, p. 136).
Any idea that can be so proli cally invoked and widely understood as a good by both the left and right
should be examined very closely. Osterweil (2020) calls the word a “ oating signi er” and a “moral
value,” by which she means it’s a vague concept rather than a well-de ned one, used to gesture toward a
moral position (she compares it to “democracy” and “organization”) (p. 123). Beyond moral goodness,
it’s tricky to pin down what exactly community conveys. Little (2002) writes that it’s a “slippery”
concept (p. 3). Sihlongonyane (2009) calls it an unstable phenomenon, with “its meaning embedded in
context” (p. 144). The ambiguous nature of the word provides ample room for interpretation, and
accordingly, community work applies to many strategies and covers a lot of practical and ideological
ground.
The community field can be conceptualized as a collection of community tactics, projects,
organizations, ideological beliefs, et cetera, all of which move together along a political spectrum, not
in perfect synchronicity, but in a messy pile, according to the climate of the time. There are exceptions
on either ideological side: there is left-leaning community work during conservative times, and
right-leaning community work during more progressive times, and at any given moment, there is a
spectrum. But generally speaking, the tenor of the work is shaped by its context, and the politics of the
time infuse the community  eld (DeFilippis et al., 2010; Sihlongonyane, 2009). In our present
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moment, this is not good news. Fisher and Shragge (2008) illustrate the situation this way: “A
hegemonic devotion to the credo of unbridled capitalism rules the world, spilling over into all facets of
life including community organizing,” (p. 12).
In Contesting Community, DeFilippis et al. (2010) outline the history of community action in
the United States, beginning in the late 19th century with voluntary associations and the social
settlement house movement. Over the following century, industrialization increased urban
populations and density, people were segmented into city blocks and neighborhoods, and community
e orts assumed a signi cant role in social and political life (p. 41). The theorists observe a political tide
in the  eld that rolls back and forth across this history, between a “canon” of progressive community
work and an “anti-canon” of reactionary and conservative community work. The canon takes place in
the years 1900-1920, 1930-1946, and 1960-1975; the anti-canon, the 1920s, the 1950s, and from 1975
on. According to this framework, we are still on the conservative side of things (pp. 43-66). This is a
helpful conceptualization, although it does obscure the dialectical relationship that exists between
dominant forms of community work and resistance to them. At any given time there is tension and
in uence that  ows in both directions, and each era contains the seeds of the next (p. 43).
This framing of history informs a critical analysis of the ways in which contemporary
community action cooperates with neoliberalism, and how that cooperation limits, constrains, and
contradicts organizational missions and goals. The book’s central argument is that for community
e orts to succeed (to support healthy communities, which I will de ne shortly), they must resist
neoliberal capitalism, rather than cooperate with it. Furthermore, they must do so by “maintaining
con ict at the core of their activities” (p. 33).
THE COMMUNITY CASE FOR VIOLENCE 8
What might that look like? Fisher and Shragge give the Battle of Seattle as a promising example
(2008, p. 12). These protests targeted the 1999 World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference,
during which members of the WTO gathered in Seattle to launch a new round of trade negotiations.
Opposition to the conference was based in criticism of globalization and featured a controversial series
of actions. The controversy arose from the central involvement of anarchist philosophy and anarchist
protesters, some of which utilized black bloc: the practice of dressing in black out ts to ensure
anonymity while protesting (Antifa might be a more recognizable term). This tactic often accompanies
acts of vandalism and property destruction. Not all participants in the Seattle protests employed
destructive tactics, but enough of them did, and these acts centered in the primary narrative of events.
The black bloc (and some other protesters not in bloc) smashed police cars, threw bottles at o cers,
and ultimately overwhelmed police forces. The National Guard was activated. Over 500 people were
arrested (Oldham, 2009). If this was community work, it was certainly a con ict-oriented kind, which
makes it an interesting proposal for the future of the community  eld.
To understand the reasoning in presenting events in Seattle as a model, it’s helpful to think
about what motivates this kind of con ict. The motivation depends on the practitioner, because
di erent groups riot for di erent reasons. This paper is interested in riots performed by groups with
liberatory or abolitionist critiques of the state, which narrows things down, but doesn’t simplify them.
The two groups in mind (and although they are arguably “groups” they are overlapping, loosely
organized, and barely a liated ones) are anarchists and protesters of police brutality. Not everyone in
these groups participates in rioting or looting, but this paper is interested in those that do. Why do
protesters dress in black and smash things? What’s the point of the destruction? Mainstream
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understanding of these actions does not interpret them as tactical but chaotic, and if there is intention,
it is malicious.
According to DeLuca and Peeples’ (2002) understanding of events, protesters in bloc in Seattle
were attacking the material manifestations of corporate power (Nike, Starbucks, and McDonalds were
main targets). They were attacking property and defenders of property (the police, who were
defending the corporate buildings from damage). In doing so, they were levelling a critique. They
recognized corporations as the new dominant global power, “eclipsing the nation-state,” (p. 126) and
aimed at them. In other words, there was cogent theory behind their actions. Their tactics were in
keeping with their understanding of power: that it lies in the material forms of capitalism and
corporatism. This kind of protest isn’t intended as a display of public opinion, like a nonviolent march.
It doesn’t cooperate with the government. Protesters who engage in this activity sneer at permitted
protests, seeing them as confused and toothless, because the philosophy behind these tactics includes
the belief that the government will never voluntarily concede to the masses, not to the extent that the
protesters demand. The intention of destructive direct action can be articulated in di erent ways: to
attack capital, or to express the urgency of demands, or to articulate systemic critiques. These are three
ways of saying the same thing, but each angle matters. The goals of anarchist groups are di cult to pin
down by nature, and some people participate for other reasons: the catharsis of breaking the things
they  nd oppressive, the fun of participating in mass actions, or solidarity with other protesters—but
criticism of the state is usually central.
These tactics simultaneously make a critique and broadcast it. DeLuca and Peeples (2002)
write about the protests in Seattle as a “competing image event” (p. 127), intended to distract from and
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contrast with the WTO conference. The argument here is that the conference was designed by the
Clinton administration with visuals in mind, with the understanding that by the late 1990s, visuals
(speci cally those on television) were crucial to promoting political ideas. So the protesters provided
their own competing political idea, one that framed corporatism and capitalism as things which hurt
people and which could be attacked. As I understand it, that’s the general idea behind this kind of
protest. It is an attempt to make oppressive systems visible, to provide an avenue against them, and to
insist upon—not request—change. Disruptive protest visibilizes the existence and possibility of
alternative systems, and it broadcasts that message as loudly as it can.
The broadcast is built into the tactics, which attract attention. Violence in Seattle was
perpetrated by a small percentage of protesters and decried by the rest of them, including lead
organizers, and some peaceful protesters tried to stop acts of destruction. But of course this was not the
story that went on the news. The anarchists were front and center, because what they were doing was
shocking and threatening, and their actions de ned the public understanding of the protest (DeLuca
& Peeples, 2002, p. 138). That pattern repeats whenever there is violence at political actions, because
the violence is usually the most interesting thing happening. So images of violence are disseminated.
Today our political visuals are spread online more than on television, but the principle remains the
same. This is obvious; anyone who was online during the summer of 2020 saw this practice in action.
All of this is to say that confrontational protest has a point of view and is not violence for the
sake of violence. It is destructive, but it isn’t random or irrational, and whether or not you agree with
the underlying theory, these actions are informed and directed by political thought and strategy. In
citing the Battle of Seattle as a promising model for future community work, Fisher and Shragge
THE COMMUNITY CASE FOR VIOLENCE 11
understand this, and they explicitly call for more con ict in community practice. Observing the creep
of neoliberalism into the community sphere, DeFilippis et al. make the same case for oppositional
tactics to re-enter the  eld. Until this happens, community work won’t be able to do much good, for
many reasons, some of them conceptual, some of them logistical.
Limitations of contemporary community work
Community work and protest seem to pursue the same goal—very generally: to help
vulnerable people. So why isn’t community work su cient on its own? There are a myriad of reasons,
but they boil down to a general theme: it is not su cient because community problems are
fundamental to, and inseparable from, our existing systems, and community work as it stands today
does not challenge those systems. Take poverty as a very broad example, because when we talk about
“community problems” or “urban problems,” we are often talking about consequences and
manifestations of wealth inequality and poverty (by poverty I mean the material conditions generated
by race, class, ability, and so on). Poverty is baked into, reproduced and deepened by, and necessary for
the functioning of the United States’ economic system. Necessary because it generates labor; it’s the
threat that makes people work to the extent and under the conditions to generate pro t. Baked into
because you can’t have eternally increasing growth unless that money is coming from somewhere—and
money  ows away from the poor, according to Marx’s conception of value production, which informs
this line of thinking. In this framework, value produced by the working classes is appropriated and
drawn upward, away from working people, which places them in increasingly precarious economic
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positions (Marx, 1867/1990, pp. 340-353). There is no pro t without poverty, not unless there is some
serious redistribution of wealth happening alongside it, and in the United States there is not.
My point is to demonstrate the entrenched nature of these issues. To eliminate poverty in this
country would necessitate a signi cant transformation of its political and economic structures, and
since that is not the goal of most contemporary community development e orts, they aren’t making
much headway on it (I’m joking, not implying that they could accomplish it if they wanted to).
Gilmore writes that social-service nonpro ts do not solve social problems. Rather they attempt to
mitigate them for “persons who are in the throes of abandonment” (2007, p. 45). The dominant forms
of community work that are being practiced right now are not going to solve poverty, or homelessness,
or environmental racism, or mass imprisonment, or any of the other problems that currently face us.
Nor do they seem that interested in trying, or even understanding why they would want to try.
Sihlongonyane (2009) writes that contemporary community development (which has assumed
dominance in the  eld, eclipsing community organizing) focuses on middle-class goals and values,
rather than the social causes associated with the term in the 1960s (p. 142). The change in focus arises
from functional aspects and contextual constraints. I’ll explain a few of these, the ones I think are most
signi cant.
The growth of American nonprofits
Nonpro t organizations have existed in what is now the United States since the mid-17th
century, but their massive proliferation happened in the last four decades. This rapid growth occurred
in parallel with, and partially as an e ect of, the slow dismantling of the country’s social welfare system.
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Nonpro ts formed to take up the work that the state was no longer doing, both informally (urgent
needs remained, so nonpro ts formed, or they adjusted their missions toward what had formerly been
state work) and formally (through government contracts) (Fisher & Shragge, 2008, p. 7; Gilmore,
2007, p. 45). This was particularly true in the case of housing, which helps to explain the centrality of
housing in contemporary community practice, and why nonpro t organizations have become the
suppliers of a ordable housing in the United States (DeFilippis et al., 2010, p. 89). Similar, if less total,
transformations happened in other areas. As the state withdrew from the work of service provision and
began to delegate its work to nonpro t organizations, the community  eld professionalized and
weakened.
Professionalization
Gilmore (2007) describes the transfer of responsibility for service provision as a process of the
state withdrawing from peoples’ lives. Government agencies which previously provided direct social
services were hollowed out and transformed into “policing bodies” which oversaw service provision
rather than administering it. Provision itself was increasingly done by community organizations (pp.
44-45). In practice, this meant that people collecting bene ts or participating in welfare programs no
longer did those things in interaction with the state. One e ect of this change was a slow shift in public
conception of the government’s responsibility to people. The shift happened for everyone: the public,
the government, and the nonpro t organizations. Now, if you had needs, you didn’t take them to the
state—the state was not accountable to you. If you obtained services through a community
organization, you might understand that the organization was doing government work, but you no
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longer interacted with the government itself. To some extent, it had retreated. The retreat helped
invisibilize the state, removing it from public consciousness. It became distant and unseen, more
di cult to conceptualize or understand, to access. And as the state gradually abandoned people, it
shifted in their minds, until it was no longer seen as a provider of services. It was present in peoples’
lives in other ways, however. This process was accompanied by the escalation and militarization of
policing in the United States, and the dramatic explosion of the country’s prison population.
Because nonpro t organizations stepped in for the state, forming a non-governmental system
that nonetheless does state work, Wolch calls the nonpro t sector the “shadow state,” and that
conception persists in theoretical work on the subject (Wolch, 1990, as cited in DeFilippis et al., 2010,
p. 91; Gilmore, 2007, p. 45-46; Trudeau, 2008). This is a critical framing, attentive to the signi cant
power imbalance present in the dynamic. DeFilippis et al. write that relationships between
organizations and the state are “usually structured in such a way that community organizations are in a
position of being responsible for the provision of social services, but not in a position of control over
those services” (2010, p. 91). The shadow state may look like the state, but it has none of the state’s
power.
As community organizations adopted the responsibility of social service provision, the
community  eld formalized and professionalized. Working with the government necessitated the
incorporation of community organizations into nonpro ts with 501(c)(3) status, a tax classi cation
granted by the Internal Revenue Service. This classi cation has existed for over a century (it was created
in the Revenue Act of 1913), but the rapid growth of 501(c)(3) nonpro ts happened in the second
half of the 20th century; there were 50,000 such organizations in the United States in 1953, and
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734,000 of them by 1998 (Smith, 2007, p. 7). To obtain this status, organizations must prove to the
IRS that they are engaged in “charitable” work, which in many cases means service provision.
These nonpro ts receive their funding from foundations. Foundations can be either nonpro t
corporations or philanthropic trusts, but in either case, they are entities which hold and dispense
wealth, theoretically for charitable purposes. The biggest examples are well-known and enormously
in uential: the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation,
and so on. Foundations are often characterized as inherently conservative institutions, given the source
of the money inside them and its tax-exempt status. Gilmore (2007) calls it “twice stolen”—amassed
exploitatively by industrial tycoons, then stolen again from the public, because it is sheltered from
taxation (p. 46). And it is sheltered inde nitely. Foundations are only required to spend 5% of their
total wealth annually, and the rest of the money can remain untouched. To receive tax-deductible
foundation grants from these entities, organizations must have 501(c)(3) status. The status also
prohibits them from engaging in political advocacy (Smith, 2007, p. 6-7).
Because nonpro ts have very few resources available to them, they are dependent on the grants
issued by foundations. The grant process is competitive, and organizations must try and outdo each
other for funding, which encourages a competitive rather than collaborative atmosphere in the  eld.
The grant process also shapes the political tenor of community work, because the more closely an
organization can align with a foundation’s mission and funding priorities, the more likely it is that they
will obtain funds. This makes sense, but foundations do not traditionally fund radical work. They
certainly don’t fund confrontational anti-capitalist work, which is often illegal and always
controversial. Because of this funding structure, con ict-oriented work goes o  the table for most of
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the  eld, and cooperative work dominates. Nonpro t missions change slightly in pursuit of funding,
and the  eld shifts to the right.
Foundations are currently undergoing a small transformation. Some are choosing to increase
the percentage of their money that they spend annually, pushing more of their wealth into circulation
and removing it from tax shelter. Some are rebranding, or shifting their missions and funding priorities
toward more progressive, and in some cases radical, goals. The Revolution Will Not Be Funded (2007)
suggests many interesting ideas about funding strategy, some of which reject foundations entirely, but
some of which propose reforming them, or reforming how organizations work with them. I don’t
mean to discount that area of thought with this point. But I think the general critique stands, since the
major players haven’t dramatically changed their approach to funding. Moreover, I would argue that
for foundations to change to an extent where this critique no longer applied, they would function so
di erently that calling them “foundations” would no longer make sense.
These combined factors—the withdrawal of the state and the hand-o  of service provision to
community organizations, the legal formalization that accompanied that process, the way nonpro t
funding works—together, these resulted in the professionalization of much of the community  eld, as
organizations adjusted tone and mission in order to work with the government and pursue grants.
These forms of interaction with the state and with conservative funding sources came with limitations.
Whether or not nonpro ts wanted to pursue radical missions, or missions that provided some form of
dissent or opposition to the government, that door was closed. The cumulative e ect was a rightward
shift in the  eld. With everything  owing in a conservative direction—organizational missions, tactics,
culture, programs—it became di cult to understand why a community organization might take an
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oppositional stance toward government. The state and the community  eld were not in con ict but in
cooperation.
Weakness
This is a general critique of the  eld. Not all nonpro ts and organizations have
professionalized, not all of them cooperate with their neoliberal context, and many of them have good
ideas, whether their tactics are confrontational or not (the thesis of this paper is not that tactics must be
violent to be helpful or worthwhile). DeFilippis et al. give examples, such as ACORN (the Association
of Community Organizations for Reform Now) before it dissolved (pp. 134-164). Mutual aid projects,
jail support, and an infrastructure of other community e orts arose around the nightly protests in
Portland, OR during the summer of 2020. These projects did not engage in confrontational tactics but
provided support to those who did, forming a peaceful sca olding around protesters. This is the
tentative suggestion that this paper is making, one path that community organizations might explore,
to the extent that they are able.
There are adjustments that might be helpful, short of revolutionary system changes. Theorists
often critique the project funding strategy, which is the model by which left-leaning nonpro ts are
almost always funded. Organizations are granted money on a project-by-project basis, which means
that grants are awarded for speci c programs or projects, but are not intended and may not be used for
organizational costs. The organization itself is left to operate on a very tight budget, and a great deal of
planning and energy must go into keeping it alive. This is a signi cant factor in the short lifespan of
most community organizations (Fisher & Shragge, 2008, pp. 11-12; Gilmore, 2007, p. 51).
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But even the rare organizations that are not constrained by a relationship to the state, those
that are successful in securing adequate funding, and those that are aware of, and able to resist, the
conservative atmosphere of the community  eld—even these are limited in other ways. Community
organizations and their employees experience the conditions of neoliberal capitalism, just like the
people that they are trying to help. They are subject to economic pressure, they typically have limited
resources, and their workers are usually vulnerable. Community work is very rarely lucrative. The more
radical the work, the more that tends to be true, and sta  are trying to be helpful with very few
resources, both personally and on an organizational level (Munshi & Willse, 2007, p. xviii). The reach
of community organizations is limited in large part for this reason. This is why foundations are so
in uential: organizations really need their money.
Historical perspectives
Practicing in a liberal context
As community scholars are fond of saying, the problems facing communities are systemic. This
means that they are built into our systems on all levels. This paper is concerned with the macro; so by
systems I am referring to capitalism (economic) and liberalism (philosophical). In calling liberalism a
philosophical system, I mean that it is a system of thought which informs, undergirds, and justi es
political, economic, and social structures and systems—including, of course, those pertaining to the
community. Liberalism is the dominant ideology in the West, including the United States. It
encompasses both political parties, and both liberal (as it is generally used today, to mean ostensible
progressivism) and conservative beliefs. As Bell puts it, “most inhabitants of the West are now conscripts
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of liberalism: the scope of the tradition has expanded to encompass the vast majority of political
positions regarded as legitimate” (emphasis original) (2014, p. 689).
There is disagreement on how to de ne the boundaries of liberal ideology, both because it has
evolved over centuries and was never uni ed to begin with, and because the label was retroactively
applied to philosophers and thinkers who did not de ne themselves as liberals in their time.
Delineating the exact contours of a philosophy is beyond what I can o er here, but I’ll give what I
understand to be a conventional (if constructed) understanding of liberalism’s birth, and the tenets
that I think are central and relevant, insofar as this argument is concerned. Bell (2014) writes that “at
the turn of the twenty- rst century, the dominant narrative views [liberalism] as a product of the
mid-seventeenth century or earlier. In the former, the French and American revolutions and the global
spread of capitalism play a starring role; in the latter, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the religious
wars in Europe” (p. 692). Assuming the former, liberalism triumphed in the late 18th century, winning
out against the Ancien Régime, belief in absolute monarchy and established religion (Duncan, 2014b).
It has been the dominant philosophy in the West ever since, resisting challenges from communism and
fascism (Paxton, 2004).
That doesn’t mean that there has been no ideological variation over the past two centuries.
Unchecked accumulation of capital during the industrial era resulted in a global crisis of capitalism in
the 1930s, which in the United States manifested as a severe economic crash and subsequent unrest.
Most Western governments mitigated the disaster by softening capitalism’s edges. The United States
increased regulation on industry and founded its welfare system, marking the beginning of the
Keynesian era. The programs and policies of this era mitigated the emergency, but basic political and
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economic structures remained unchanged, which left the reforms vulnerable to rollback—and
predictably, that vulnerability was eventually exploited. The government began to hollow out the new
agencies in the 1970s. The neoliberal era is the period of the slow unraveling of the welfare state and
simultaneous loosening of industry regulations. Although there is not perfect consensus on the
timeline, most theorists agree that this period stretches from the mid 1970s to today (DeFilippis et al.,
2010, p. 40; Gilmore, 2007, p. 45; Munshi & Willse, 2007, p. xv). There isn’t total agreement on the
meaning of the word, either, but Bell (2014) explains that “since the 1970s [neoliberalism] has served as
shorthand for the valorisation of the minimal state and deregulated market” (p. 702), and that is how I
understand it here.
It’s easy to credit the conservative transformation of community work to the transition from
Keynesian liberalism to neoliberalism, because the timeline aligns, and because it’s technically true. The
transformation of the community  eld described in the short history above did happen during the
period described as neoliberal, and it seems characteristic of that period, since one of the most cited
features of neoliberalism is the dismantling of the welfare state. But this is a conclusion drawn from a
short historical perspective, one which only considers the last half century in its scope. I think that a
persistent focus on neoliberalism allows liberalism to fade from view, slipping from sight and escaping
attention. As concerns this paper, liberalism evades blame in (much of) community studies, escaping
culpability for problems discussed in the  eld. Harvey notes that when we talk about neoliberalism as a
source of problems, we tend to disappear and absolve capitalism, which is the same basic point
(Risager, 2016).
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The implication when we blame neoliberalism is that the neo is the problem, that if we could
wind back the clock  fty years, the situation would improve. If that is true, it’s only because we would
be temporarily undoing a consequence that is all but guaranteed. Neoliberalism is an extremely
predictable destination of liberalism. It’s the place where liberal society arrives; because when market
logic directs society, it will eventually consume most everything else, including the principles which
held the market in some degree of check. That process is necessary to maintain perpetually increasing
growth: pro t must be found in, and pulled from, more and more places. That is not to say that this
process is completely mechanical, with no nuance, variation, or human in uence, but it is the logical
trajectory of liberal philosophy.
Because neoliberalism is a subset of liberalism, the structural di erences between the two are a
matter of degrees, and their philosophies do not meaningfully di er. Just as neoliberal economics are
liberal economics with the safety o , so too is neoliberal philosophy just a heightened version of liberal
philosophy, one which has seeped into and infused more and more aspects of life. An often observed
aspect of neoliberalism is the commodi cation of absolutely everything (hobbies, friends, self, soul,
etcetera) as pro t is wrung from more and more locales. This occurs as market logic is applied in new
areas, but the core aspects of the philosophy behind that logic have not changed. Paxton (2004) de nes
them below, talking about the triumph of liberalism in the late 18th century:
Unlike conservatives, [liberals] accepted the revolution’s goals of liberty, equality, and
fraternity, but they applied them in ways suitable for an educated middle class.
Classical liberals interpreted liberty as individual personal freedom, preferred limited
constitutional government and a laissez-faire economy to any kind of state
intervention, whether mercantilist, as in the early nineteenth century, or socialist, as
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later on. Equality they understood as opportunity made accessible to talent by
education; they accepted inequality of achievement and hence of power and wealth.
Fraternity they considered the normal condition of free men (and they tended to
regard public a airs as men’s business), and therefore in no need of arti cial
reinforcement, since economic interests were naturally harmonious and the truth
would [win] out in a free marketplace of ideas (p. 22).
This is one summation of the core of liberalism. Various scholars have di erent conceptions of the
philosophy (Bell, 2014). But it’s a description that I recognize and believe, and it comes from a classical
liberal project de ning its own values (Liberté, égalité, fraternité). This de nition’s resonance suggests
that it might be relevant, and its context situates it in the heart of a signi cant liberal e ort, so I think
it’s a fair de nition to use here. I recognize these principles because they persist today. Liberalism and
neoliberalism have in common individualism, dominance of the market, and supposed, but more or
less imagined, meritocracy. These traits may intensify or weaken depending on the historical moment,
but they are core aspects of liberal philosophy. Speaking about the overlap between neoliberal and
neoconservative beliefs (both of which fall within the scope of liberalism), Gilmore notes a shared trait:
“a frightening willingness to engage in human sacri ce while calling it something else” (2007, p. 44). I
suggest that human sacri ce was an aspect of liberalism from the start, due to the necessary presence of
capitalism alongside it.
A philosophy of market dominance paired with very little support for social welfare cannot
help but undermine communities. There is an unresolvable contradiction between the market and
community, which DeFilippis et al. observe and name as a central piece of their book’s argument
(2010, p. 80). A healthy community exists when a group of people experiences security and resilience,
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when the group is stable and bonded enough that the individuals within it can lean on one another, be
supported, recover, and grow, and when the group facilitates and enables accountability between
people. Capitalism fragments and mines communities, displacing people, scattering them whenever
and wherever is useful for pro tability and management of surplus value (Harvey, 2004). It places
millions of people in such atomized and perilous positions that it is di cult for them to bene t from
social support, let alone provide support to other people. Basic survival—which means labor, work,
attempting to a ord the things one needs to continue living—consumes time and energy to an extent
that building and maintaining relationships becomes di cult. At the same time, capitalism creates
structures which don’t require a community to function. It is perfectly possible to survive in the
United States with a job and no friends.
In short, liberalism isn’t for helping everyone. It never was, and it didn’t ever purport to be. It
has always been a philosophy in which supposedly skill, but in practice class (and to a much lesser
extent luck) determines one’s life outcomes. Economic mobility is not really experienced by poor
Americans, but supposing that it was, millions of people would still be left in poverty, su ering for the
crime of not being skilled enough to  nd a way out of it. That is the implication of meritocracy: if
success is something that is earned, that means you have to earn it, and those that don’t manage to do
so deserve what they get. Liberalism is not a philosophy which supports healthy communities, because
it is the opposite of secure. It encourages and justi es precarity, a state in which one must work to stay
alive. Survival is always in question.
I don’t see this understanding represented in the community  eld. It’s not that theorists don’t
critique capitalism and its e ects on communities, but I don’t often see the real urgency or scope of the
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problems being discussed, their fundamental and systemic nature. We often say that they are “rooted.”
That doesn’t just mean that problems are deep or di cult to solve. It means that they are inherently
wound up in our systems (social, economic, political), and that they cannot be unrooted without very
serious critical engagement with those systems, and in my view, considering the depth of the problems,
the dismantling and replacement of those systems. These discussions are not central, but they should
be. A full conversation is necessary, because of the volume and level of su ering in question, and
because of the rate at which we can expect things to worsen, given (if nothing else) the accelerating
climate crisis.
Liberalism makes it hard to see things in these terms. One aspect of liberal culture is a sort of
post-history perspective, one which is currently being challenged by dramatic circumstances but is
persistent and gives real resistance to understanding or contextualizing—in some cases even
remembering—events. Lowe identi es an “economy of a rmation and forgetting that characterizes
liberal humanist understanding,” (2015, p. 39) by which she means that liberal humanism (her
wording) swallows, absolves, and erases its own contradictions and horrors. Its stability rests on its
ability to do so. Forgotten acts include “the dispossession of indigenous peoples and the settler logics of
appropriation, forced removal, and assimilation that are repeated in contemporary land seizures,
militarized counter-insurgency at home and abroad, and varieties of nationalism in our present
moment,” as well as neoliberal trade practices (2015, p. 38). I suggest that this forgetting is evident in
our discussion of community problems and tactics. The severity of our current situation slips again
and again from mind. To see clearly, other lenses might be applied, ones which make it easier to
critically examine systems. I think that a materialist view might be helpful.
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Historical materialism
Benjamin (1969) explains historical materialism as an alternative method to what he calls
historicism, which he explains as  attened history, history that has been reduced to a consistent, empty,
equalized  ow of information, all of which bears the same weight. Time becomes “homogeneous,
empty” (264). As he puts it, “historicism gives the ‘eternal image’ of the past; historical materialism
supplies a unique experience with the past” (emphasis added) (p. 262). This framework approaches
history as the dynamic process of struggle between classes, a process in which the present is an active
part. Paxton (2004) describes it this way: “Marxists, fascism’s  rst victims, were accustomed to thinking
of history as the grand unfolding of deep processes through the clash of economic systems” (p. 8).
Historical materialism comes originally from Marx and is a core aspect of Marxist thought (Schecter,
2007, p. 11).
Historicism is accompanied by the concept of progress, the notion that at the end of this
uniform slog of history is improvement, that things generally trend for the best and will continue to do
so, that we are forever moving toward slightly improved and more enlightened times. These imagined
times are essentially the same as our own, just a bit better. Arendt (1970) explains the idea, which she
identi es as unknown prior to the 17th century and “an almost universally accepted dogma” by the
19th, as “the reassuring idea that we need only march into the future, which we cannot help doing
anyhow, in order to  nd a better world.” She continues: “Progress gives an answer to that troublesome
question. And what shall we do now? The answer, on the lowest level, says: Let us develop what we
have into something better, greater, et cetera.” (p. 25). Benjamin describes progress as a storm that
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pushes the angel of history forward into a future to which his back is turned, “while the pile of debris
before him grows skyward” (1969, p. 258).
I don’t think that perspectives which imagine futures are necessarily bad. They seem essential,
actually, since abolitionists imagine futures too. If anything, the problem is that there is not enough
imagination in the thinking that Arendt outlines above. Belief in progress is not imaginative, because
the only reality that you can conjure up is the one already in front of you. By presenting itself as a  nal
and enlightened worldview, liberalism constricts the imagination rather than expanding it.
Abolitionists can imagine revolutionary futures because of their perspectives on the present and the
past, because they reject historicism and embrace the bigger picture. They practice the kind of history
that I’m defending here.
The most troubling implication of progress is the notion that we have things basically right,
and that our situation will improve if we just continue what we’re doing with some minor adjustments
along the way. Osterweil explains how historical understanding works against this notion of progress,
writing that “studying history also has a vital abolitionist role. Ideology would have us believe that
capitalism, the nation-state, the police, prisons, and other violent forms of oppression are timeless,
in nite facts” (p. 18). She argues that understanding the recent origins of these structures enables us to
envision a world beyond them. History contextualizes, and historical materialism does so particularly
well. It helps us see history in terms of shapes and trends, as dynamic rather than uniform, not as a
forward march of progress but as interactions between classes as they struggle for power. DeFilippis et
al. are in agreement here, explaining that they look at the history of community initiatives with a
“wide-angle lens” because it “instantly expands understanding of the varied goals, politics, and shapes
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community e orts take” (p. 35). Of course, this perspective is not enough on its own—Duncan,
speaking speci cally about the French revolution, explains that the Marxist interpretation of things can
be satisfying at  rst glance but fall apart when examined closely (2014a, 3:15). It is just as important to
examine the speci c circumstances in question. But it’s helpful to look at things in broad strokes, and
in terms of class relationships (and these things aren’t mutually exclusive with details). This view of
history is a story of shifting power relations over time, in which we can discern patterns which bear
relevance to us: Benjamin’s  ashing moments of warning and recognition (1969, p. 255). Or, as he
writes here:
The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not
the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with
this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task to bring about a real state of
emergency, and this will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism (p. 257).
This is still true, including the bit about fascism.
When Imbroscio (2011) calls speci cally for Marxist voices in urban studies, I think it’s in large
part because of this conceptual framing of history. I think that this perspective can help us see
liberalism and capitalism—not see them in any particular way, not necessarily morally, but just see
them: their attributes and features and patterns of enactment, see that they are a particular philosophy
and a particular form of economic organization, but certainly not the only philosophy or form that
have ever been used, or the only options available to us.
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Rioting and looting as material community tactics
I’ve attempted to demonstrate why current practices are not su cient for addressing
community problems or meaningfully advancing community health, and I’ve suggested a historical
perspective that may help us think about the stakes and our options. What would tactics informed by
this perspective look like? There are any number of possibilities, but this paper is speci cally concerned
with rioting and looting, so I will limit my discussion there. I tentatively suggest that these acts are
materialist in nature, in two respects: (1) they embody the materialist understanding of history that I
describe above, and; (2) they attack the material forms of capitalism and liberalism.
First, I am arguing that rioting and looting are tactical, which implies an element of
deliberation and choice. I think this is a fair implication. Although riots are often characterized as
chaotic and random violence, they aren’t completely out of control. They consist of individuals
making decisions. Piven and Cloward (1979) make this point, writing that:
While [rioters’] rebellion often appears chaotic from the perspective of conventional
American politics, or from the perspective of some organizers, it is not chaotic at all; it
is structured political behavior. When people riot in the streets, their behavior is
socially patterned, and within those patterns, their actions are to some extent deliberate
and purposeful (p. 18).
The practice of looting can also be characterized as purposeful action. Osterweil calls it “a radical and
powerful tactic for getting to the roots of the system the movement  ghts against” (2020, p. 104). This
is the place where liberal support sometimes evaporates. Rioting might be understood as a justi ed
emotional response to state oppression, but looting is usually interpreted as petty theft divorced from
theory: people stealing televisions, not critiquing the government. Osterweil argues that the media
THE COMMUNITY CASE FOR VIOLENCE 29
“makes criminal and moral divisions between certain kinds of Black youth—those who loot (bad)
versus those who protest (good)” (p. 8). But as she understands it, “looting is a method of direct
redistribution of wealth” (p. 4), because when people loot they are enriching themselves at the cost of
whichever business they’re robbing—and while it’s not always the case, these businesses are more often
than not corporations. Osterweil describes the theft as a way to “solve some of the immediate problems
of poverty,” (p. 4) as well as an act of property destruction; because when something is stolen, it ceases
to be a commodity. Thus looting has an inherently anti-capitalist character. The general belief amongst
anarchists is that any successful attack of capital is a good one. Stealing from corporations is
understood to be a moral act, regardless of the political philosophy motivating you to do it.
According to this theory, rioting and looting are deliberate and purposeful acts, often
undertaken intentionally with radical goals in mind, but anti-capitalist even when not accompanied by
revolutionary ethos. The intentional character of this description matches DeLuca and Peeples’
analysis of events in Seattle. But when one takes a wider perspective, as Piven and Cloward do below
and elsewhere, there is only so much deliberation involved in actions which are triggered by massive
economic and social forces, beyond any one individual’s control:
Our main point, however, is that whatever position one takes on the ‘causes’ of mass
unrest, there is general agreement that extraordinary disturbances in the larger society
are required to transform the poor from apathy to hope, from quiescence to
indignation (1979, p. 14).
Engels makes the same point, writing that 19th century Marxists believed that “revolutions were not
made intentionally or arbitrarily, but that they were always and everywhere the necessary result of
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circumstances entirely independent of the will and guidance of particular parties and whole classes”
(1847, as cited in Arendt, 1970, p. 12).
These ideas are not mutually exclusive: the notion that massive social pressure produces
uprisings among the poor and oppressed does not preclude individuals among those groups from
making choices and acting with intention. Some riots are more planned than others, but all of them
(like all of our decisions and identities and experiences) are shaped by forces larger than the individual.
They are generated by social patterns, and by economic and political structures beyond the control, if
not the in uence, of any particular person. With this perspective, the question of whether or not
rioters have an explicitly revolutionary ideology seems less important (depending of course on the riot
in question. I am writing here about riots performed by the oppressed in response to their
subjugation). Historical materialism helps us keep this in mind, because it frames things in terms larger
than the individual. Here too it is useful to think of systems and patterns, bringing them to the
forefront, making them seen.
This historical view informs the perspective behind Osterweil’s work on looting as a
purposeful and just act, and it informs the perspective behind the thread of argument defending riots
as legitimate political activity. This argument holds riots as both liberatory and e ective, and applies to
current and historical events, spanning and pre-dating the United States’ existence. Of particular
relevance is the popular argument applying this line of thought to slave resistance. Sinha centers slave
revolts in the history of abolition in the United States, writing that “prominent slave revolts marked the
turn toward immediate abolition . . . Recent historians have declared black resistance to enslavement
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passé, but it was central to abolition” (2016, p. 2). Osterweil agrees, characterizing mass slave escapes as
a blow against the state:
The enslaved freed themselves. They did so with an act of mass looting and strike that
shook the regime of white supremacist capitalism to its core: they stole themselves from
their masters and, in so doing, abolished a huge percentage of America’s wealth, a
wealth, according to historian David Roediger, “equal to the combined value of all
capital invested in manufacturing, railroads, and banks, as well as all currency in
circulation and all federal expenditures” (2020, p. 39).
Sinha frames both slave resistance and the abolitionist movement which arose around it as
oppositional to the systems I’ve discussed here, writing that “if slavery is capitalism, as the
currently fashionable historical interpretation has it, the movement to abolish it is, at the very
least, its obverse.” As for liberalism, she observes that “as radical agitators, [abolitionists] were
not so much theorists of liberal democracy as critics of it” (2016, p. 3). In other words, the early
abolitionist movement included a critique of liberalism, one with material resistance at its
heart. If police brutality and mass imprisonment are the modern continuations of slavery, as is
frequently argued, then resistance to the two cannot be untangled, and a line of continuity
should be recognized from the early abolition movement in the pre-colonial era to protests
against police brutality now  (Williams, 2015, pp. 51-87). This line of thought holds that state
control of Black people has shifted in appearance but not in character: from slavery to police
violence and mass incarceration (where labor is extracted from people). If violent resistance to
slavery is understood to be liberatory, it follows that violent resistance to modern forms of
control should be too.
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Riots are a form of collective action that express this theoretical view. In doing so, they convey
an understanding of liberalism and capitalism as things that exist in material forms, forms which can be
identi ed and targeted as a tactical strategy, bringing them into focus. For these reasons, I think that
they’re promising, and according to Piven and Cloward, historically that has been the case. They write
that, “whatever in uence lower-class groups occasionally exert in American politics does not result
from organization, but from mass protest and the disruptive consequences of protest” (1979, p. 36).
Their main point here—a main point of Poor People’s Movements as a whole—is that for any gains to
be made, those disruptions must be understood as just and supported by strategies that “escalate the
momentum and impact of disruptive protest at each stage of its emergence and evolution” (p. 36).
Something to think about when we consider how community organizations might play a role in our
present moment.
Conclusion
In this paper I have attempted to convey the limitations of contemporary community work,
arguing that structural constraints make it impossible for community organizations to solve pressing
community problems in the United States. The problems nonetheless need solving. With this in mind,
it is interesting to think about which kinds of dissent are considered justi able and which are not,
when a historical perspective indicates that more disruptive strategies are the ones that usually work.
My aim with this paper is to drag that problem into the light. I have no intention of prescribing tactics
to practitioners, nor do I think “riot” is a tactic that can be prescribed, for the reasons explained above.
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Riots arise from material conditions and periods of enormous pressure. They do not occur because
people prescribe them instead of other strategies.
So I’m not necessarily advocating for violent action, but I do think engagement with this
contradiction would be useful. Most of the work being practiced and advanced by the community  eld
does not challenge the forces which undermine and harm communities, so the problems will persist.
These problems include an escalating epidemic of police brutality and murders of Black people,
unchecked climate destruction, a crisis of mass imprisonment, labor conditions under which the poor
are languishing, etcetera—conditions which are not survivable, in which people and communities are
increasingly endangered. I see riots and liberal condemnation of them as a point of access to this
problem, a place where the problem is made visible. When dissent begins to meaningfully challenge the
forces that erode and shatter communities, becoming potentially e ective, it crosses the line and is
abandoned, if not condemned and undermined, by law-abiding community practitioners. How do we
make sense of that paradox, when the broadest goal of the community  eld is to meaningfully and
materially help people? What does it mean if the most promising tactics available are destructive and
illegal?
I’m echoing Imbroscio’s call for a challenge to liberalism, speci cally in the  eld of community
studies. It is essential that the community  eld employ a critical lens and a historical view, because we
need these things to keep the stakes in sight. If our goal is to support healthy communities, and if the
situation is as urgent as it seems—it would be helpful to broaden our perspective and reconsider our
strategies.
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